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Rescued from the Grave and Then
Covered with Mud: Justice Scalia and the
Unfinished Restoration of the
Confrontation Right
Richard D. Friedman

†

Some years before his death, when asked which was his
favorite among his opinions, Antonin Scalia named Crawford v.
1
Washington. It was a good choice. Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Crawford reclaimed the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution and restored it to its rightful
place as one of the central protections of our criminal justice
system. He must have found it particularly satisfying that the
opinion achieved this result by focusing on the historical
meaning of the text, and that it gained the concurrence of all
but two members of the Court, from all ideological positions.
I. THE OLD REGIME
The Confrontation Clause expresses in simple terms a
basic principle that has been essential to common-law
jurisprudence for centuries, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
2
witnesses against him . . . .” In other words, a witness against
an accused must testify face-to-face with the accused—not, say,
by speaking to the police in the stationhouse. And yet, for most
of American history articulating the nature of the confrontation
right was of relatively little importance, because pretty much
any result that the Supreme Court could achieve by relying on

† Arlene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School. Thanks to Sam Gross. Copyright © 2016 by Richard D. Friedman.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE
SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 369 (2007) (noting that when asked
to identify “the favorite of his opinions,” Justice Scalia “came up with an
esoteric case interpreting the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.”
What counts as esoteric evidently is a matter of context).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the Clause it could also achieve by construing the infinitely
malleable doctrine of hearsay. That changed in 1965, when the
Court held that the Confrontation Clause expresses a
fundamental right incorporated against the states by the
3
Fourteenth Amendment. Now it really mattered what the
Clause meant, because the Clause binds the states but federal
conceptions of hearsay law do not. Not until 1980 did the Court
attempt to articulate a comprehensive conception of the Clause.
4
And when it did, in Ohio v. Roberts, the result was a failure.
The Roberts doctrine, especially as it was developed by
subsequent cases, virtually constitutionalized contemporary
conceptions of the law of hearsay. First, the scope of the Clause,
like that of hearsay doctrine, extended to any out-of-court
5
statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserted.
Second, the Clause usually permitted such a statement to be
6
admitted if it fit within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,”
and even if no such exception applied, admissibility might still
be supported “by a showing of particularized guarantees of
7
trustworthiness” —a doctrine that closely resembled the
residual exception to the hearsay rule, now set forth in Federal
Rule of Evidence 807. The Clause barred admission of some
out-of-court statements if the declarant was available but did
not testify at trial—but it appeared that the Court would apply
the unavailability requirement only in settings in which
8
ordinary hearsay doctrine did as well.
The most significant problem with the Roberts doctrine
was that it did not articulate any principle worthy of respect.
The Court declared that the doctrine was meant to weed out
9
unreliable evidence. But that would be an odd goal—that
evidence is unreliable cannot preclude admissibility, because
even live eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable. The
very point of a trial is to assess a complete body of evidence,
some parts of which will usually point in opposite directions,
which necessarily means that some are unreliable. Moreover, if
reliability appears to be all that is at stake, the trial court’s
3. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
4. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
5. See id. at 66 (indicating that the Clause operates “when a hearsay
declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial”).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
9. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.

2016]

RESCUED FROM THE GRAVE

41

inclination will usually be to admit the evidence, because it will
usually appear that truth determination will be advanced by
letting the jurors hear the evidence rather than shutting their
eyes and ears to it.
And so the Roberts doctrine generated a great deal of
dissatisfaction, from academics and others, including Supreme
Court Justices. There were glimmerings that some Justices
would favor a different view of the Confrontation Clause. In
two settings involving the question of what trial procedures
constitute satisfactory confrontation under the Clause—as
opposed to the issue covered by Roberts, when the Clause
tolerates admissibility of a prior statement—Justice Scalia
wrote in support of a bright-line understanding of the Clause.
In Maryland v. Craig, writing in dissent for the Court’s three
most liberal members and himself, he objected to an allcircumstances-considered approach, articulated for the
majority by Justice O’Connor, to the question of whether a
child can sometimes testify against a criminal defendant by a
remote electronic connection, without the ability to see the
accused; the Court’s decision, he said, conspicuously violated “a
10
categorical guarantee of the Constitution.” And in 2002, he
issued a statement when seven members of the Court voted not
to transmit to Congress a proposed amendment to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 26 that would have more generally
allowed witnesses who could not come to court to testify by
remote electronic means. Making clear that their opposition
was based on the Confrontation Clause, he thundered,
“[v]irtual confrontation might be sufficient to protect virtual
constitutional rights; I doubt whether it is sufficient to protect
11
real ones.”
And meanwhile, in two cases some Justices directly
questioned the Roberts doctrine. In White v. Illinois in 1992,
Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence, joined by Justice Scalia,
indicating sympathy for the view put forth by the United States
(in an amicus brief written in large part by Samuel Alito) that
the Clause “should apply only to those persons who provide incourt testimony or the functional equivalent, such as affidavits,
depositions, or confessions that are made in contemplation of
12
legal proceedings.” And in Lilly v. Virginia in 1999, drawing
10. 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 207 F.R.D. 89, 94 (2002) (statement of Scalia, J.).
12. White v. Illinois, 506 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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on an amicus brief submitted by the American Civil Liberties
13
Union, Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence suggesting that the
prevailing view of the Clause was arguably too broad in that
“[i]t would make a constitutional issue out of the admission of
any relevant hearsay statement” and too narrow to the extent
it would allow “out-of-court statements prepared as testimony
for a trial when such statements happen to fall within some
14
well-recognized hearsay rule exception.” Justice Thomas
wrote a brief opinion adhering to his White concurrence, and
Justice Scalia wrote an even briefer opinion that contained this
pointed and arresting passage:
During a custodial interrogation, Mark Lilly told police officers that
petitioner [his brother Ben] committed the charged murder. The
prosecution introduced a tape recording of these statements at trial
without making Mark available for cross-examination. In my view,
15
that is a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation.

How refreshing! Justice Scalia asked us to look at the
circumstances in which Mark Lilly implicated Ben and the fact
that Ben never had a chance to cross-examine Mark. That was
all we needed to know, in his view, to recognize that use of
Mark’s statement against Ben had violated Ben’s confrontation
right.
Before Crawford, then, at least three Justices, Justice
Scalia among them, had indicated a willingness to replace
Roberts by a categorical approach that applied only to certain
types of out-of-court statements but that did not depend on an
assessment of reliability for determining a Confrontation
Clause violation. The Roberts doctrine still stood, however; no
decision had undercut or chipped away at its foundations. And
then, with stunning suddenness, Crawford swept the entire
edifice aside and replaced it with another.
II. THE CRAWFORD TRANSFORMATION
The basic conception of Crawford is simple. The
Confrontation Clause does not speak in terms of hearsay, or
reasonableness, or reliability. Rather, it says in straightforward
terms that the accused has a right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. Witnesses, Justice Scalia wrote, are

13. I was one of the principal authors of the brief, along with the late
Margaret Berger.
14. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 141–42 (1999).
15. Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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16

those who “bear testimony.” Drawing on historical practice, he
reached the conclusion that “[t]estimonial statements of
witnesses absent from trial” are allowed by the Confrontation
Clause “only where the declarant is unavailable, and only
where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross17
examine.” Wisely, he did not attempt to define the bounds of
the key term “testimonial”; that would have been too much to
bite off in one case. But he asserted bluntly that the statement
involved there—description of a criminal incident made to the
police several hours later, in the stationhouse, under
considerable formality, and in response to “structured police
questioning”—was testimonial “under any conceivable
18
definition.”
The scope and power of Crawford should not be
underestimated. The opinion simply discarded the mush of
Roberts and established in its place a conception of the
confrontation right that was textually and historically sound
and that expressed a simple, straightforward principle that
most members of our society recognize as a core part of our
criminal justice system: a witness against an accused must
testify face-to-face with the accused, under oath and subject to
cross-examination, if reasonably possible at trial, and not in
any other way, such as by speaking to the police in the
stationhouse.
To be sure, the opinion was far from perfect. It went out of
its way to “reiterate that, when the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial
19
statements” —thus entrenching a doctrine, which Justice
20
Scalia had helped to develop, that failed to recognize how the
confrontation right is impaired if by the time of crossexamination the witness is no longer standing by an assertion
previously made. Parts of the opinion seem to me to put too
much emphasis on the state of the law “at the time of the
16. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). Justice Scalia’s use of
Webster’s Dictionary for this definition has been derided. But it is an oddity of
the English language that we use words with different roots for testimony and
for those who give it. Had Justice Scalia said that witnesses are those who
make “witnessy” statements, the reasoning would have been clear, but the
inelegance would have been hard to tolerate.
17. Id. at 59.
18. Id. at 53 n.4.
19. Id. at 58 n.9.
20. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
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21

framing,” as if the Confrontation Clause froze in time a
snapshot of the law of 1791, rather than expressing (what most
of the opinion addresses) the broad conceptions that the
Framers understood to be expressed by the right. And I believe
the emphasis throughout much of the opinion on governmental
abuse is mistaken; a witness can make a testimonial
statement, the use of which at trial would violate the
confrontation right, without any involvement of government
officials at all. These are not small matters, but they do not
minimize how remarkable the achievement of Crawford was.
III. FORENSIC LAB REPORTS
The subsequent history has not been so happy, but I will
begin with one very bright spot: Justice Scalia’s opinion for a
22
bare majority of the Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.
In accordance with state law, the prosecution had proven that
substances in question were cocaine by introducing certificates
from forensic lab analysts, without presenting the analysts for
confrontation. Justice Scalia’s opinion properly declared this
practice a straightforward violation of Crawford. And one-byone, he gave a deserving back-of-the-hand to each of the
contentions made by the state or the four dissenters: the
23
witnesses weren’t “accusatory”; they weren’t “‘conventional’
24
(or ‘‘typical’ or ‘ordinary’)” witnesses; they weren’t reporting
historical events but rather the results of “neutral, scientific
25
testing”; the certificates should be deemed exempt from the
Confrontation Clause because they were official or business
26
records; the accused had the right to subpoena the analysts if
27
he wanted to; requiring the analysts to testify live would
28
create an intolerable burden on the trial process. With respect
to each, Justice Scalia’s response was, in effect, “doesn’t matter,
even if it were true.” The sole problem with this magnificent
opinion, in my view, is that it gained the votes of only five
members of the Court.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 n.5.
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Id. at 313.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 321–22.
Id. at 324–25.
Id. at 325.
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The remaining four—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito—have not given in. Indeed, it
appears that they hoped that Justice Sotomayor’s accession to
the Court would help them quickly undo part of Melendez-Diaz,
29
but if so they were unsuccessful. In Bullcoming v. New
30
Mexico, they again dissented, believing that although the
author of the forensic lab certificate in question again did not
testify at trial it should have sufficed that another analyst from
31
the lab, who did not observe any of the testing, did so. Finally,
32
in Williams v. Illinois, the foursome achieved a limited
victory. In that case, swabs taken from a rape victim and sent
to a commercial lab led to generation of a male DNA profile
that presumably belonged to the perpetrator, and search of a
DNA database led to identification of the accused. At his trial,
an analyst testified to the match but nobody from the
commercial lab testified. The foursome would have held on
various grounds—including that the lab had made no
statements making an accusation of a “targeted” individual—
that there was no confrontation violation. The other five
Justices disagreed with virtually every aspect of their
reasoning. But Justice Thomas agreed with them that the
report was not testimonial, on the idiosyncratic ground—“one
Justice’s one-justice view,” as Justice Kagan pungently put
33
34
it —that the report was not sufficiently formal.
29. Four days after the decision in Melendez-Diaz, the Court granted
certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia (in which I represented the petitioners). 559
U.S. 32 (2010). The grant was puzzling, because the question presented by the
Briscoe petition appeared to have been decided in Melendez-Diaz. There was
widespread speculation that the foursome hoped that the replacement of
Justice Souter by Justice Sotomayor, whose nomination had been announced,
would lead to a different result. And Justice Scalia lent force to the
speculation at argument, when he asked, “Why is this case here except as an
opportunity to upset Melendez-Diaz?” and then added, “I'm not criticizing
Virginia; I'm criticizing us for taking the case.” Transcript of Oral Argument
at 58–59, Briscoe v. Virginia, 559 U.S. 32 (2010) (No. 07-11191). It quickly
became apparent at argument that Justice Sotomayor was not going to upset a
seven-month-old precedent, and two weeks later the Court did what it
probably should have done from the start: remanded Briscoe for
reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.
30. 564 U.S. 647 (2011).
31. See id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
32. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
33. Id. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
34. I posted the report on my blog, saying, “it seems to me that simply
looking at the report demonstrates whatever degree of formality any [J]ustice
is likely to require for a statement to be considered testimonial.” Richard D.
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Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming are still the law, and there
is no majority opinion in Williams. Lower courts have
expressed confusion about the law governing forensic lab
reports, but so far the Court has shown no inclination to clear
matters up. Perhaps when, ultimately, Justice Scalia’s seat is
filled, the Court will step back in. But, given that a new Justice
would have no more votes than Justice Scalia did, and could
not cast them any more soundly in this realm than he did, I do
not anticipate any favorable developments in the near term.
IV. FRESH ACCUSATIONS
I am even less happy about the state of the law in the other
area that has generated considerable post-Crawford
development: fresh accusations of a crime, typically made by
the alleged victim.
35
The trouble began with Davis v. Washington. Under that
caption, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court decided its
first two substantive Confrontation Clause cases after
Crawford, both involving oral statements made to law
enforcement officials by alleged victims describing acts of
36
domestic violence. One of the two, Hammon v. Indiana, did
not prove difficult. There, the speaker made the statement at
home, a considerable time after the incident, to a police officer
who had responded to a 911 call, while another police officer
held the alleged assailant, her husband, at bay. But the wife
did not testify at trial, which was held before Crawford, and the
prosecution was allowed to introduce both her oral statement
and an affidavit that she completed immediately after. After
Crawford, the state supreme court recognized that admission of
the affidavit was improper (though harmless, it held), but
insisted that the oral statement was not testimonial. I
represented the husband before the Supreme Court, and I was
confident that the judgment would be reversed; if this evidence
were permissible, then a witness could testify against an
accused by speaking to the police in her living room. Justice
Scalia also regarded the case as an easy one, as apparently did

Friedman, The Cellmark Report, and What It Shows, THE CONFRONTATION
BLOG (Dec. 15, 2011, 12:43 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/
12/cellmark-report-and-what-it-shows.html. I was so wrong.
35. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
36. 546 U.S. 976 (2005). Hammon was ultimately argued in tandem with
Davis. See id.
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seven other members of the Court; only Justice Thomas
dissented, as in Williams, asserting alone that the statement
was not sufficiently formal to be testimonial.
I would have preferred nine votes, but eight was not bad.
The other part of the tandem, Davis itself, was another matter.
There, the alleged victim, Michelle McCottry, made her
statements as part of a 911 call, in obvious distress and
apparently beginning while her assailant was still in the house;
38
he was, in any event, at large throughout the conversation.
Based on his questioning at argument, I had guessed that
Justice Scalia would conclude that the statements were
testimonial; I had hoped that he, if not the Court, would adopt
the principle that any statement to a known police officer
accusing another person of a crime is per se testimonial. But
instead, the Court unanimously held that the first part of the
conversation—enough to support Davis’s conviction—was not
39
testimonial. This decision came during Chief Justice Roberts’s
first term on the Court, and I believe the unanimity may have
reflected his attempt to generate more consensus among the
Justices. In any event, given the result, it would have been
better had it been based on the assertion (whether accurate or
not is another matter) that, in the heat of the moment, a person
in McCottry’s position would not be focused on the probable
evidentiary use of her statements. Instead, Justice Scalia
articulated an amorphous standard under which, if the
statement was made for the “primary purpose” of resolving “an
40
ongoing emergency,” it is not deemed testimonial. Justice
Thomas properly pointed out in his separate opinion that this
standard was vague and manipulable; a speaker will often have
multiple purposes, and a court will have a free range of choice
41
in identifying the “primary” one.
Just how manipulable the standard can be is exemplified
42
by Michigan v. Bryant, the first Confrontation Clause case in
which Justice Scalia dissented. Covington, a shooting victim,
made statements to police officers identifying Bryant, his drug
dealer, as the assailant. The interactions occurred at least half
an hour after the shooting and several miles away. Neither
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Davis, 547 U.S. at 829.
Id. at 817.
See id. at 819.
See id. at 822.
See id. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
562 U.S. 344 (2011).
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Covington nor the police acted with any urgency in finding
Bryant; the shooting apparently resulted from a drug deal gone
bad, and there was no suggestion that a potential serial killer
was on the loose. And yet the majority, in an opinion by Justice
Sotomayor, held that the primary purpose of Covington’s
43
statements was to resolve an ongoing emergency. The theory
of the opinion was befuddling, especially because it attempted
to determine an overall purpose of the conversations—even
though questioner and declarant might obviously have very
different understandings of the situation. Justice Scalia wrote a
pained dissent, in which he argued, quite properly in my view,
that the declarant’s perspective should govern in determining
44
whether the statement was testimonial.
I believe Covington’s statements should have been deemed
testimonial—they were clearly made for the purpose of
identifying and bringing to justice the person who had shot
him. But holding that the Confrontation Clause barred their
admissibility would have been a most unappealing result,
because Covington died of his wounds several hours later. Note
how different the case would have looked had he survived and
been readily available to testify at a trial of Bryant on
attempted murder charges but either he or the prosecution
decided that he would stay away. Nevertheless, the holding of
Bryant would mean that even then the Confrontation Clause
would impose no constraints on use of his out-of-court
statements.
Thus, Covington’s statements should have been deemed
testimonial, but the Confrontation Clause should not have
required their exclusion. How could that be? Even assuming, as
Crawford suggested, that there might be a dying-declaration
exception to the confrontation right, supported by history as a
45
sui generis matter, it would not have applied, because there
was no indication that at the time Covington made his
statements he knew that his life was in imminent danger. But
Bryant should have been an ideal case for application of a
doctrine of forfeiture, which was a possibility also recognized by
Crawford. That is, the trial court should have been able to
make a threshold finding that the reason that Covington was
unavailable at the time of trial was that Bryant had engaged in

43. Id. at 349.
44. Id. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
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serious intentional misconduct—shooting Covington—that had
the foreseeable effect of rendering Covington unavailable at
trial, and that Bryant had therefore forfeited the confrontation
right.
That should have been a possibility—but it was foreclosed
46
by Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Giles v. California.
Giles, accused of murdering his former girlfriend, Brenda Avie,
acknowledged the killing but claimed self-defense. The
prosecution sought to introduce a statement Avie had made to
a responding police officer about three weeks earlier, accusing
Giles of an act of domestic violence. Before the Supreme Court,
the state did not dispute that Avie’s statement was testimonial,
but it contended that Giles had forfeited the confrontation right
47
by killing her. The Court held, however, that an accused does
not forfeit the right unless the conduct that rendered the
witness unavailable to testify at trial was “designed” to achieve
48
that end. I have offered elsewhere reasons why I believe this
decision was a mistake, not required by equity, common sense,
49
or history. I will not repeat my vituperations here, other than
to say that it was predictable—and predicted—at the time of
Giles that its unduly narrow interpretation of forfeiture
doctrine would lead to unduly narrow constructions of the term
“testimonial,” and that this is precisely what happened in
Bryant. If I am right, it is sadly ironic that such a devastating
blow to the doctrine of the Confrontation Clause resulted, albeit
indirectly, from an opinion by Justice Scalia that was overly
protective of the Clause.
In any event, before his death, Justice Scalia certainly had
a strong sense that the Court was bent on cutting back further
50
on the Crawford doctrine. Ohio v. Clark,
the last
Confrontation Clause case decided by the Court during his
lifetime, was the first since Crawford to deal with statements
by a young child. The outcome was not much in doubt; the
46. 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
47. Such a holding would require a threshold determination by the trial
court that Giles killed Avie without justification, which is of course was the
question before the jury on the merits of the case. But this should not have
been a problem. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Giles v. California: A Personal
Reflection, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 733, 736 (2009).
48. Giles, 554 U.S. at 368.
49. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 47, at 742–45; Richard D. Friedman,
Come Back to the Boat, Justice Breyer!, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
1 (2014).
50. 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).
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Court was unanimous that the statements, made to preschool
staff members by a boy not yet three-and-a-half years old, were
51
not testimonial. But Justice Alito’s opinion for the majority
seemed to Justice Scalia so determined to let the emergency
doctrine of Davis swallow the basic regime of Crawford that he
wrote a particularly anguished concurrence “to protest the
Court’s shoveling of fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in Crawford
52
. . . .”
CONCLUSION
The predictions of doom in Justice Scalia’s dissents had a
53
way of becoming self-fulfilling. I hope that this will not prove
to be true in the context of the Confrontation Clause. In the
short term, I am not optimistic. Most of the developments since
Crawford have been unfortunate, and some of the Justices have
made clear their desire to limit Crawford to the extent they
can. The most we can hope in this realm from a new
appointment to the Court is that it will not make the situation
worse than it has been.
And yet, over the long run, I am optimistic because I
believe that once a great conceptual threshold is crossed, courts
will ultimately winnow out doctrine that does not work and
embrace doctrine that does. I am hopeful that over time the
Court will recognize that a more robust doctrine of forfeiture
than the one created by Giles is appropriate, that when it does
it will also adopt an ungrudging definition of the term
“testimonial,” and that it will give full force to Melendez-Diaz.
Perhaps I am being unduly optimistic, though I have the very
long run in mind. In any event, the attempt to develop a sound
conception of the Confrontation Clause is likely to persist for
decades at least, and it will always be remembered that the
Court took the first and most decisive step under the leadership
of Justice Scalia, establishing that the Clause means what it
says and that it expresses a principle that has been central to

51. Id. at 2177.
52. Id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (saying, despite the majority’s insistence that the case did not
require the Court to decide whether the government had to recognize formally
any homosexual relationship, that the reasoning of the majority “leaves on
pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples”).
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our system for centuries: that an accused has a right to demand
that witnesses against him testify face-to-face.

